Russia can't win. What happens next?
In order to succeed, Putin needs general mobilization, or nuclear weapons, or China
What comes next in Ukraine?
Everyone wants to predict the future. Of late I have seen a proliferation of articles attempting to forecast various “scenarios” for how this war may end, then seeking to assess the plausibility of each. Most of these predictions make little sense, largely because the authors have not allowed their minds to proceed very creatively.
For example, one such piece by Mark Galeotti in the Telegraph, published a few days ago, offers four options: 1. The long war (war of attrition). Rated most likely. 2. The ugly deal (unfavorable peace deal for Kyiv to end the destruction). Rated not so likely. 3. Frozen conflict (stalemate with low-level conflict). Rated more likely than “ugly deal.” 4. No more Putin (coup). Rated very unlikely.
The first and fourth scenarios are possible, but this analysis, and some others like it, ignore several likely outcomes. They also lack useful predictive value. For example, we may see a war of attrition—but who wins such a war? Is that good for Russia, or good for Ukraine?
Indeed, this list doesn’t include the most likely short-term outcome: a limited Ukrainian conventional victory. It also fails to consider the long-term effects of that victory on Putin and Russia.
Unlikely
1. Russia wins in a swift conventional war (say, less than a year), seizing all territory east of the Dnieper and then crossing to take western Ukraine.
This is nearly impossible. Russia does not have enough troops; it can’t replace troops; and it has trouble replacing equipment, too. About 30% of the invading force has been rendered combat-ineffective (BTGs that are either completely destroyed or temporarily out of action). Russia has suffered at least 10,000 deaths and a further 10,000 non-fatal casualties; this accounts for at least 10% of the invading force. These losses are disproportionately concentrated among elite units like the airborne VDV. Russia has also lost at least 500 tanks and a further 700 fighting vehicles—more tank losses than the entire inventory of the French, German, or British militaries. (Again, these are undercounts.)
Both troops and equipment are very difficult to replace. Russia deployed about 75% of its professional soldiers (“contract soldiers”) to Ukraine, and some troops need to remain in Kaliningrad and other strategic locations, so there are very few fresh contract soldiers available. Thus Russia must rely on reserves and conscripts. Putin did recently mobilize about 60,000 reserves, but these troops lack good training—a problem that only grows worse with conscripts. And dead conscripts threaten domestic stability. In short, the troops Russia has left cannot be allowed to die, but certainly will die, because they aren’t very good.
Likewise, equipment losses can be replaced, but much remaining equipment is older or has been in storage for a while. In general, new equipment is of lower quality than the destroyed equipment it replaces. And Russia lacks the manufacturing capacity to replenish its reserves, especially with sanctions. (Russia’s Uralvagonzavod tank plant, which produces the T-90 and upgrades the T-72, has already shut down due to a lack of spare parts).
Troop losses are so worrying for Putin because Russia is actually outnumbered. Usually you want a 3-1 advantage for offensive warfare—but Ukraine likely has at least 50% more troops available than Russia does without further mobilization. Of course Ukraine can’t mobilize many more, but foreign volunteers continue to arrive, many with good military training. Ukraine also has no trouble replacing equipment. In fact the Ukrainians have captured about as many tanks as they have lost—and many of the new ones are better than the ones they replaced. They’re also receiving hundreds of T-72s from Slovakia and Poland, and over 100 armored vehicles from Britain. Germany may even send 50 Leopard 1 tanks and a number of Marder IFVs, though not until next month at the earliest. With time, I expect to see more SAM systems as well (Sweden is considering the medium-range NASAMS system, which would be perfect here). In many areas, Ukraine actually has more and better equipment than it did before the invasion.
In short, a Russian conventional victory in the next few months is impossible. That’s the starting point for assessing Putin’s options.
2. Russia reduces its aims, seizes the entire Black Sea coast, including Odessa, and declares victory.
I have heard certain distinguished foreign policy experts offer this as a likely endgame, but I see no pathway to victory for Russia along the Black Sea coast. An amphibious landing is out of the question following the loss of the Moskva, and Russian forces have repeatedly failed to advance on Mykolaiv. Actually, Russia’s only foothold west of the Dnieper—Kherson—is itself under threat. Russia’s goal on this front is to prevent collapse, not to advance.
3. Russia’s upcoming Donbas offensive succeeds, Mariupol is taken, and Ukrainian troops are forced to withdraw across the Dnieper to avoid encirclement. Again, Putin declares a limited victory.
This is possible, but still not terribly likely. In the first place, the Donbas offensive probably won’t succeed, though Russia may be able to take Mariupol before Ukraine can relieve it. In fact, I think it’s more likely that the offensive collapses, as at Kyiv, under the weight of unsustainable casualties, especially given the manpower shortages described above.
But even if Russia did succeed in reaching the Dnieper, it’s hard to imagine that Ukraine stays on the west bank. Eventually, Ukraine is likely to push forward again, and I just don’t see how Russia can win, barring extraordinary luck. As noted, Ukraine has more troops and will soon have generally better equipment. With some air cover or decent air defense, Ukraine’s military is simply better. There’s no incentive to give up and let Russia hold the east. Nor will Russia have much incentive to stay in the east; if the Donbas offensive succeeds, they’ll be tempted to move on.
4. War with NATO.
This also isn’t happening—not yet. Where would Russia attack—the Baltics? Everyone will see it coming, and why would Putin risk nuclear war? Besides, he has no troops to spare. Finland, once Finland joins? Again, no troops, and Russia will lose anyway. Many people still seem to fear a scenario in which Putin steamrolls Ukraine and then moves on. He can’t.
Putin’s choices
In short, Putin can’t easily win a conventional war. With that in mind, what can he do?
1. Putin uses tactical nuclear weapons to force a favorable settlement.
This is more likely than any scenario above. If Ukraine continues to win, as it probably will, Putin may feel obligated to resort to nuclear war. The West won’t intervene, and Putin will at least be able to seize and hold the east, or perhaps the whole nation.
2. Putin orders a general mobilization.
For now, this option is most likely. But it’s not clear that Russia can win, even with general mobilization. (Putin may do so on May 9, Victory Day, or perhaps issue an official declaration of war that day in preparation for eventual mobilization.) An eventual numerical advantage may come, but poor equipment, long-term economic issues, and Ukraine’s increasing technological advantage as the West pours in aid may still ensure Russian defeat.
3. Putin gives in.
Putin realizes the long-term risks of this war, cuts his losses, and engages in gradual withdrawal, inflicting casualties on Ukraine until reaching pre-war positions (Crimea and eastern Donbas). This might end the war, provided Ukraine refrains from further advances, which is uncertain. It’s hard to imagine Putin taking a choice so fatal to his personal sense of mission, but he may calculate that it’s the only way to stay in power, and hope to try again in a few years.
The consequences of continued war
Suppose Putin chooses the most likely option—continue to mobilize and continue to fight. Maybe, at some point, he even uses tactical nuclear weapons. What happens?
1. The military or security services stage a coup.
A coup is more likely than a popular uprising, but not probable, either. It’s very hard to think of anyone with enough power to lead such an action. Putin has even divided his own military, failing to appoint a single commander in Ukraine until very recently selecting Aleksandr Dvornikov, probably because he fears his own generals. Putin may hold on even if the war degenerates into a broader, multi-front struggle, or even a civil war. Or else he may see the risk coming and simply retreat, even if defeated (though a nuclear strike seems equally plausible).
2. As Ukraine continues to fight and Russia mobilizes, the war degenerates into a repeat of 1917—a broader Russian Civil War.
Putin refuses to give in, ordering a general mobilization. Chechnya and Dagestan rebel, Lukashenko is overthrown by his own military while Belarusian rebels join the war in Ukraine (they already have, others are sabotaging Russian logistics in the country). Some Georgians travel to Ukraine, others force their government to seize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Ukraine retakes Crimea and the Donbas and is tempted to invade Russia itself as the country falls apart. Eventually the Russian military splinters.
3. Through some twist of fate—or Chinese intervention—Russia prevails in a multi-year bloodbath.
It’s not likely, but the unexpected is not impossible: perhaps Zelensky is killed and no effective successor emerges, allowing Russia to capitalize. But the real key to a long-term Russian victory is Chinese support, especially Chinese equipment, or Chinese support to continue domestic military production. It may be Putin’s only real hope.